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THE IMPACT OF CLERGY SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT LITIGATION ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
PATRICK J. SCHILTZ*
Abstrad: The harm that the direct. victims of clergy sexual misconduct
have suffered has been the subject of extensive publicity. By contrast,
the harm that the indirect victims suffer has received little attention.
This Article identifies and discusses the costs—to those who belong to
churches and to those who are served by churches—of using litigation
to bring about compensation for victims of clergy sexual misconduct.
These costs include loss of monetary resources a church would
otherwise use for religious, charitable, or educational purposes; the
possibility of a ministry not representative of the people it serves;
decreased positive interactions between pastors and their congregants; a
changed relationship between bishop and pastor in which bishop is no
longer a confidant; changes in the structure of the church's hierarchy;
and finally, a decreased ability for churches to participate in public life.
This Article contends that using litigation to compensate victims of
clergy sexual misconduct poses a threat to religious freedom. The
Article concludes by recommending that churches devise a means of
fairly compensating victims with as little harm to religious liberty as
possible.
The religion clauses are a favorite subject of those who write and
publish law review articles. Many gallons of ink have been spilled over
such topics as prayer at high school football games and creches in
public squares—topics that have symbolic importance, but little to do
with the day-to-day ability of Americans freely to exercise religion. At
the same time, relatively little has been written about one of the most
serious threats to religious liberty in modern-day America—the thou-
sands of lawsuits that have been, and will continue to be, filed against
religious organizations by victims of clergy sexual misconduct.
The purpose of this Article is to describe why these lawsuits pose
a threat to religious freedom. I make no attempt in this Article to ad-
* Associate Dean and St. Thomas More Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Min-
nesota) School of Law. I am grateful to Thomas C. Berg, John H. Garvey, Phillip H. Harris,
Douglas Laycock, and Elizabeth R. Schiltz for their comments on a prior draft of this Arti-
cle.
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dress the many difficult constitutional and public policy questions that
clergy sexual misconduct litigation raises. Rather, I seek only to de-
scribe the significant impact that this litigation has on religious lib-
erty—an impact that must be taken into account by judges, legislators,
and others when they address the constitutional and public policy
questions.
I. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
A few preliminary comments:
First, since 1987, I have represented or advised religious organi-
zations in connection with over 500 clergy sexual misconduct cases in
almost all fifty states and in several foreign countries. I have advised
just about every major Christian denomination in the United States. I
did most of this work as a practitioner, but I have continued to consult
with churches since becoming a law professor in 1995. Although my
work has brought me into contact with hundreds of congregations,
accused pastors, and alleged victims,' I have worked almost exclusively
on behalf of national organizations and regional "judicatories," such
as dioceses and synods. To a significant extent, I have relied upon my
own experience in writing this Article, both because I have as much
experience with this issue as just about anyone, and because there is
little reliable empirical information available.
Second, by writing only about the impact of litigation on relig-
ious liberty, I risk giving the impression that I regard this as the most
important issue raised by clergy sexual misconduct—and I risk having
this Article be interpreted as an apologia for pastors or churches. To
be clear, not a word of this Article is meant to excuse the crimes of
those pastors who sexually exploit children and vulnerable adults.
Neither is a single word of this Article meant to excuse the conduct of
those bishops who learn of abusive pastors and do little about them. I
have spent many hundreds of hours witnessing first hand the pain
' For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to a member of the clergy accused of sexual
misconduct as a 'pastor," the entity that employs the pastor as his '`congregation," the per-
sons served by the pastor as his "congregants," and the ecclesiastical superior of the pastor
as his "bishop." I will often use the word 'church" to refer collectively to the religious or-
ganizations—local, regional, and national—that must defend clergy sexual misconduct
lawsuits. Finally, reflecting the fact that most bishops and pastors are male, and most vic-
tims of sexual abuse female, I will use male pronouns when referring to the former and
female pronouns when referring to the latter.(Although the media focus on Catholic
cases involving male victims, non-Catholic pastors vastly outnumber Catholic priests, and
their victims are overwhelmingly female.)
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caused by clergy sexual misconduct, and many hundreds of hours be-
ing frustrated by the decisions of bishops, including some whom I ad-
vised. I know how much victims have been harmed, and I know how
badly some bishops and pastors have behaved.
Finally, this Article is not an argument that victims of clergy sex-
ual misconduct should not be compensated for their injuries. Rather,
this Article is intended to identify the costs—to those who belong to
churches and to those who are served by churches—of using litigation
to bring about that compensation. The harm that the direct victims of
clergy sexual misconduct. have suffered has been the subject of exten-
sive publicity. By contrast, the harm that. the indirect victims stiffer,
not only on account of the misconduct, but also on account of the
litigation that results from the misconduct, has received little atten-
tion, The purpose of this Article is to describe that harm.
H. THE LITIGATION
Clergy sexual misconduct litigation imposes enormous costs on
churches. Most obviously, it results in churches having to pay hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to defend and settle lawsuits. 2
 This bur-
dens the exercise of religion, in the superficial sense that a church
forced to pay money to attorneys and litigants cannot use that money
to do ministry—to build churches, to buy hymnals, to pay parochial
school teachers, to operate homeless shelters. To say that the litiga-
tion burdens churches, however, is not necessarily to say that it threat-
ens religious liberty. After all, churches likely have paid millions of dol-
lars in connection with car accidents and slip-and-falls. These costs
also burden the exercise of religion in the sense that they leave
churches with less money to do ministry, but few would be concerned
about the impact of such litigation on religious freedom. What makes
clergy sexual misconduct litigation different—what distinguishes it
from car-accident litigation—is not just the enormity of the potential
liability, but the fact that this liability results directly from decisions
that are deeply imbued with religious significance.
Obviously, the decisions I speak of are not the decisions of abu-
sive clergy to commit sexual misconduct. Instead, I speak of decisions
made by those who end up being the codefendants of abusive pastors.
These codefendants are not sued for engaging in sexual misconduct,
but for making decisions that made it possible for the plaintiff to be
2 See Adam Liptak, Scandals in the Church: The Liability, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at
A20.
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abused (such as a decision not to remove a pastor from ministry) or
for harming the plaintiff in some other way (such as by responding
insensitively to a report of abuse).
In Part ILA of this Article, I describe the extent of the economic
consequences of clergy sexual misconduct litigation against churches.
Again, my concern here is not with the economic impact per se.
Rather, my concern is that, the more serious the economic conse-
quences of actual or threatened litigation on a religious organization,
the more likely it is that the litigation will affect the decisions made by
that organization. In Part !LB, I describe the nature of the claims that
are brought against churches and, in particular, the extent to which
these claims arise out of core religious exercise. Finally, in Part III, I
describe the impact of clergy sexual misconduct on religious liberty.
A. The Economic Impact
Clergy sexual misconduct litigation poses a serious economic
threat to all churches. Indeed, the economic survival of some
churches already has been threatened. The Archdiocese of Santa Fe
came within a whisker of going bankrupt on account of clergy sexual
misconduct litigation, 3
 and, more recently, the Archdiocese of Boston
has openly discussed the possibility of filing for bankruptcy. 4 For sev-
eral reasons, these lawsuits have had—and will continue to have—a
major economic impact on churches.
1. Growth in Number
As recently as the early 1980s, clergy sexual misconduct litigation
was almost nonexistent. Complaints of misconduct were handled pri-
vately by churches—and, in many cases, handled poorly. The result
was a lot of misconduct and a lot of angry victims. The tinder was dry,
waiting for a spark to light it. That spark came in 1983, with the litiga-
tion surrounding the abuse of dozens of children by Roman Catholic
priest Gilbert Gauthe. Gauthe's crimes attracted a great deal of pub-
3 See David Margolick, Sex Abuse Cases Threaten to Bankrupt an Archdiocese, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1993, at AL
4 Sec Andrew Harris, Forgive Us Our Debts, NAT'L LT, Dec. 16, 2002, at 1. For an explo-
ration of the implications of a religious organization bankruptcy filing, see generally David
A. %eel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 KC. L REv. 1181 (2003).
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licity, some of his victims filed lawsuits, the lawsuits resulted in huge
recoveries, and the legal world changed. 5
Since 1983, the amount of clergy sexual misconduct litigation has
risen dramatically, with thousands of lawsuits being reported by the
media.° Almost certainly, thousands of additional lawsuits will be filed.
For every lawsuit filed against one of my clients, I became aware of
eight to ten reports of clergy sexual misconduct that did not result in
litigation. Generally, these reports did not result in litigation because
the victim came forward to the church and the church resolved the
complaint satisfactorily. In the wake of the poisonous publicity that
churches have received, however, it seems likely that victims will come
forward less to churches and more to lawyers—and that will mean
that more lawsuits will be Filed.
Of course, many instances of clergy sexual misconduct. never
came to the attention of my clients. Estimates of the number of clergy
who have engaged in sexual misconduct vary dramatically, and "there
are no reliable studies."7 I personally have heard estimates ranging
from one or two percent to twenty-five percent. No one can say for
certain, but ten percent is not inconceivable, if sexual abuse is defined
broadly to include not only child abuse, but also sexual relations be-
tween "consenting" adults and the less serious conduct that often re-
sults in litigation.° When I left private practice in 1995, some of my
clients already had experienced ten percent of their clergy being ac-
cused of sexual misconduct of some kind.
2. Statute of Limitations
Even these numbers do not reflect the true scope of the problem,
as they take into account only pastors who are still in active ministry.
Churches must defend lawsuits arising out of sexual misconduct that
was committed not just by active pastors, but also by pastors who left
ministry or even died decades ago.
5 See Anthony 1DePalma, Church Scandal Resurrects Old Hurts in Louisiana Bayou, N.Y.
Tim ES, Mar. 19, 2002, at Al.
6 See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Decades of Damage: Trail of Pain in Church Crisis Leads to
Nearly Every Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at Al.
7 Id.
8 See infin text accompanying note 50. Bear in mind that, in the eyes of the plaintiffs'
bar, every "affair" between a pastor and a member of his congregation is abusive (because
of a disparity in power). About twenty-five percent of married men engage in at least one
extramarital affair. Michael Norman, Getting Serious About Adultery, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1998,
at B7.
954	 Boston College Law Review
	
(Vol. 44:949
Few states still apply a traditional statute of limitations to sexual
misconduct lawsuits—that is, a statute that requires someone injured
by a wrongful act to sue within a defined period of time measured
from the date of the wrongful act. Most states have instead adopted
one form or another of a delayed discovery rule, under which the
statute of limitations does not begin to run on a victim of sexual mis-
conduct until the victim knows, or reasonably should know, that she
has been injured by sexual abuse.°
There are variations among delayed discovery statutes, but, at
their most liberal, they make it almost impossible for a church to get a
lawsuit dismissed under the statute of limitations, no matter how old
the misconduct. A statute of limitations defense rarely wins before a
jury; the defense must be won at summary judgment or not at all.n
When the running of a statute of limitations turns largely upon what
is in the mind of a victim (as is true under many delayed discovery
statutes), it is very difficult to convince judges that there is "no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact"' and thus that the church is entitled
to summary judgment.
Some states have gone even further. The California legislature
amended its statute of limitations to allow anyone who has ever been
sexually abused to file suit within one year of January I, 2003. 12 It
makes no difference, under the California statute, whether or when
the victim repressed memories of being abused, whether or when the
victim knew that the sexual contact that she had experienced was abu-
sive, or whether or when the victim knew that she had been injured by
the sexual abuse. Indeed, under radical provisions of the new law, all
victims whose prior lawsuits had been dismissed on the basis of the
statute of limitations," and some victims who previously settled their
claims,'' are given a second chance to sue.
Defending lawsuits arising out of events that occurred long ago—
over sixty years ago, in some casesn—is obviously difficult for
churches. The pastor accused of the sexual misconduct and the
bishop accused of negligence may both be dead, witnesses who could
9 See, e.g., 735 L.L. COMP. STAT. 5/13.202.2(b) (2002); MINN. STAT. 541.073(2) (a)
(2003); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.046(2) (2002).
10 See Patrick .). Schiltz, Defending the Church, LiTtc.ATIon, Spring 2003, at 19, 23-24.
FED. R. Car. P. 56(c).
12 See CAI.. C1V. PRoc. Com:
 § 340.1(c) (West 2003).
is Sre id. § 340.1(d) (1).
14 See id. § 340.1(d) (2).
15
 See 70 More Bring Sexual Altaic Lawsuits in Boston Archdiocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003,
at A14.
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have testified on behalf of the defendants may have disappeared or
died, and documents and physical evidence that could prove the de-
fendants' lack of culpability may have been lost or destroyed. When
the case reaches the jury, the jury hears from the victim, who usually
gives a tearful account of being abused long ago and attracts under-
standable sympathy from jurors. In response, the church can offer
little or nothing. The church is defenseless—not because it is culpa-
ble, but because, whether it is culpable or not, the passage of time has
left it unable to defend itse10 6
3. High and Unpredictable Cost
Clergy sexual misconduct litigation is expensive. Most plaintiffs
seek to recover almost entirely for emotional injury—a type of injury
that is notoriously difficult to value objectively. What is a lifetime of
shame worth? $10,000? $100,000? $1 million? $10 million? It is very
difficult to predict how much money a jury will award in an emotional
injury case; the only thing that the church knows for certain is that
the sky is the limit.
Some plaintiffs also seek punitive damages. There are many prob-
lems with awarding punitive damages against churches," two of which
deserve mention here.
First, punitive damages often reflect the wealth of the defendant,
and the "paper" wealth of churches can be deceptive. It is not un-
common for a diocese that owns, say, a downtown cathedral valued at
$100 million to be so cash poor that it is cutting $18,000-per-year cus-
todial positions. The market for cathedrals is rather limited, and many
of the other assets of a church are similarly illiquid. As a result, it is
easy for juries to "over-punish" churches.
Second, punitive damages, like damages for emotional injury, are
almost impossible to value objectively, especially when the defendant
is a church. How much in punitive damages should he awarded
against a Catholic diocese today to punish it for a decision made thirty
years ago by a bishop who is now dead? When one bears in mind that
such (uninsurable) damages will have to be paid either by Catholic
16
 Even in less egregious cases—involving, say, a "he-said she-said" conflict over
whether a sexual relationship occurred fifteen years ago—the passage of time makes it
extremely difficult for juries to ascertain the truth.
17 In my view, awarding punitive damages against a church violates the First Amend-
ment. I made this argument—unsuccessfully--on behalf of the Archdiocese of St. Paul and
Minneapolis in Mrozka v. Archdiocese of Si. Paul & Minneapolis. 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
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parishioners donating more money or by those served by the diocese
receiving fewer services, 18
 the impossibility of objective evaluation be-
comes clear. Those who must pay the punitive damages not only had
no control over either the priest who committed the abuse or the
bishop who made the abuse possible, but they were usually the very
ones put at risk (if they were even alive at the time). To ask a jury how
much in punitive damages would appropriately punish the potential
victims of a priest's or bishop's misconduct—potential victims who had
no control over the priest or bishop and no knowledge of their activi-
ties—is to ask the nonsensical.
4. Uncertain Insurance Coverage
Many states do not permit insurance against punitive damages as
a matter of public policy, 19
 and, even where such coverage is permit-
ted, it is usually not sold to churches by insurance companies. Thus,
churches almost always find themselves without coverage for punitive
damages.
Churches often find themselves without coverage for compensa-
tory damages as well. As noted, many of the lawsuits brought against
churches involve sexual misconduct that occurred decades ago. When
a church is sued for misconduct that occurred in 1960, it is unlikely
that the church will be able to identify the company that insured it at
the dine. Even if the church can identify the insurer, it likely cannot
prove the scope or limits of its coverage. Insurers have been taking a
hard line against churches, sometimes insisting that they produce
physical copies of their old insurance policies." Few churches can do
so with respect to policies that were purchased decades ago. Even
when churches locate old insurance policies, they usually find that the
limits of coverage are grossly inadequate. A $10,000 liability policy
provided ample protection in 1960; it does not in 2003.
Even for more recent incidents, churches often find themselves
uninsured. The hundreds of lawsuits that churches have already de-
fended have diminished or exhausted much of their existing insur-
ance coverage. In addition, for the past decade or so, policies that in-
sure churches have excluded coverage for liability arising out of
18 See infra Part III.A.
18 See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 657-58 (Cal. 1999);
Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 932 (N."4'. 1990).
20 See Edward Walsh, Insurance a It'orry for Catholic Church, WAsi I. Pos•'', July 10, 2002, at
A3.
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sexual misconduct. A few insurance companies offer "riders" that
cover such liability, but that coverage is expensive and is capped at
relatively low limits. Yet even when churches purchase this coverage,
they find, when they get sued, that their protection sometimes disap-
pears. Insurance companies have been aggressive in exploiting loop-
holes in their policies. They claim, for example, that they did not re-
ceive prompt notice of the claim or that the church, in reaching out
to victims of sexual misconduct, violated the cooperation clause of the
insurance policy.
As a result of these factors (and others), clergy sexual misconduct
lawsuits are extraordinarily dangerous to churches. Churches know
that, if sexual misconduct occurs, the resulting lawsuit may be
brought long after the church loses the ability to defend itself.
Churches also know that even one sexual misconduct lawsuit, no mat-
ter when it is brought, may result in uninsured damages so large that
the church will be crippled or bankrupt. 21 As a result, churches are
extremely sensitive to clergy sexual misconduct lawsuits. Put differ-
ently, clergy sexual misconduct litigation—actual and threatened—
has a significant impact on the behavior of churches.
B. The Legal Claims
In a typical clergy sexual misconduct lawsuit, the plaintiff sues the
pastor who committed the abuse, the congregation that employed
him, and the religious organization with which the pastor and con-
gregation were affiliated.
For purposes of this Article, the claims typically brought against
pastors are the least troublesome. Clergy do not exercise religion
when they have sexual contact with children or vulnerable adults. For
the state to prohibit such contact—and require a pastor to pay dam-
ages to those he has injured—does not generally implicate religious
liberty, any more than it implicates religious liberty for the state to
prohibit pastors from murder or to require pastors to compensate
people whom they injure in automobile accidents.
Most pastors are judgment-proof, though, and most cannot ex-
pect an insurer to indemnify them for sexual misconduct. Thus, the
real focus of plaintiffs in clergy sexual misconduct litigation is on the
21
 For an exploration of the legal and moral propriety of a church invoking charitable
immunity, where available, to minimize the financial impact of clergy sexual abuse, see
generally Catharine Pierce Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justice: Making Churches
Pay for the Sins of Their Clergy, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1201 (2003).
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claims against the broader church. Plaintiffs proceed against the
church on both "no-fault" and "fault" theories.
I. "No-fault" Theories
Plaintiffs invariably seek to hold the church vicariously liable. If a
plaintiff can prove (a) that the pastor was employed by the church
and (b) that he was acting within the scope of that employment in
committing the sexual misconduct, then the plaintiff can make the
church pay for her damages, whether or not the church was at fault in
any way.
Both of these elements are litigated ferociously. Churches, not
surprisingly, argue that pastors do not act within the scope of their
employment when they sexually exploit children or vulnerable adults.
In the view of churches, a pastor commits sexual abuse to further his
own personal interests, not the interests of his employer. Plaintiffs dis-
agree. They emphasize that, in committing sexual misconduct, a pas-
tor takes advantage of a position of trust conferred upon him by the
church. Courts have issued inconsistent decisions. 22 This issue is
largely outside of the control of churches, though, and thus does not
have much impact on the way that churches conduct their ministries.
The same cannot be said for the other element that is litigated
ferociously. Usually, there is little disagreement that the abusive pastor
was employed by his congregation. The parties often disagree, how-
ever, about whether the relationship between the pastor and the na-
tional or regional organization with which he was affiliated was a
principal-agent relationship giving rise to vicarious liability.
Churches organize themselves differently. Some churches—such
as the Roman Catholic Church—are so hierarchical that there is no
question that priests function as the agents of dioceses. Other
churches—such as the Southern Baptist Convention—are so congre-
gational that there is no question that pastors function as the agents
only of their congregations. But many large American denomina-
tions—for example, the United Methodist Church, the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America, and the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.)—fall in between these two extremes. Their congregations
and pastors have more autonomy than Roman Catholic parishes and
22 A substantial majority of courts have held, as a matter of law, that a pastor does not
act within the scope of his employment when sexually abusing a congregant or counsel ee.
See N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (USA), 998 P.2d 592,599 & n.30 (Okla. 1999) (collecting
cases).
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priests, but not as much as Southern Baptist congregations and pas-
tors. 23
In cases involving these "in between" churches, the agency ques-
tion is litigated fiercely because the stakes are so high. Establishing an
agency relationship gives plaintiffs a chance to recover from the (rela-
tively) deep pocket of the church without having to show that the
church did something wrong. Thus, for churches, the question
whether all of their pastors are deemed to be their agents has enor-
mous financial consequences.
2. "Fault" Theories
Although attempts to hold churches vicariously liable have impli-
cations for religious liberty, 24 those implications pale in comparison to
those arising from attempts to hold churches liable for their own neg-
ligence. Plaintiffs have pursued several fault-based theories against
churches, including negligent ordination, negligent training, negli-
gent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention. Most of-
ten, plaintiffs argue that it was negligent for the church to ordain,
hire, or retain a pastor after it knew, or should have known, some-
thing about the pastor that disqualified him from ministry. Typically,
that "something" is sexual misconduct."
Plaintiffs have been pursuing such fault-based theories against
churches for at least twenty years. A substantial minority of courts
have rejected these claims on First Amendment grounds, holding, in
essence, that a court is barred by the First Amendment from interfer-
ing in the ordaining, training, hiring, supervising, or retaining of
clergy.26 A majority of courts have found no constitutional bar. 27
Putting aside the merits of the constitutional questions, the fact
that most courts are willing to assess the reasonableness of a decision
by a church as to whom will serve in its ministry—as to whom will
teach and preach in its name—has obvious implications for religious
liberty. It could be that the courts are acting constitutionally. And it
could be that such interference in religious freedom is the lesser of
23 See Miciunri, W. MCCONNELL	 Al.., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 420-22
(2002).
24 See infra Part 111.E.
25 For an examination of the possibility of dioceses and bishops being found criminally
negligent for sexual misconduct of individual priests, see generally John S. Baker, Jr., Prose-
cuting Dioceses and Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1061 (2003).
26 Sec Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 397, 358 & n.10 (Fla. 2002) (collecting cases).
27 See id. at 351 & 11.2 (collecting cases).
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two evils—the other evil being failing to compensate victims of clergy
sexual misconduct. As I will describe, 28
 though, it is clear that litiga-
tion over these claims has substantially burdened the religious liberty
of churches and those who belong to them.
Before addressing this point further, I want to identify three re-
cent developments that make fault-based litigation against churches
even more troubling.
First, the "trigger" has been changing. Negligent ordination, em-
ployment, supervision, and retention claims are based upon an argu-
ment that the church knew, or should have known, of something bad
about the pastor—something that disqualified him from ministry.
When I began litigating these claims in 1987, large verdicts or settle-
ments were nonexistent unless there was evidence that, prior 10 the
time the plaintiff was abused, the church knew of sexual misconduct
by the pastor. That is changing. Churches are now paying large ver-
dicts and settlements in cases in which the church knew of no prior
sexual misconduct by the pastor—indeed, in cases in which there was
no prior sexual misconduct by the pastor—but the church knew of
certain "'attribute[s] of character'"" that purportedly rendered the
pastor unfit for ministry. In one case that resulted in a jury verdict of
over $1 million, those "attributes" included depression, low self-
esteem, problems with authority, and a "sort of struggle in the area of
sexual identity."" In another case—a case in which the jury awarded
compensatory and punitive damages totaling almost $700,000—those
"attributes" included the fact that the pastor had a drinking problem
and had been through a nasty divorce many years earlier?'
28 See infra Part III.
29
 Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 327 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (quoting Con-
nes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo. 1992) (en bane)).
50 Id. at 313, 328 & n.23, 329.
31 The case was Klein v. Rocky Mountain Conference of the United Methodist Church. No.
94CV0521 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 4, 1994). My firm represented the congregation, which
settled relatively early. The large verdict was entered against the Conference. Although the
case did not result in a published decision, a separate lawsuit brought against Klein by the
Conference's insurer is reported as Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Klein, 940 P.M. 1001 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996).
I should note that arguments such as those made in the Moses and Klein cases are
grounded on a logical fallacy. The argument of plaintiffs' attorneys takes the following
form: "Of all of the pastors who commit sexual misconduct, x percent have struggled with
depression." The more telling measure is different: "Of all of the pastors who struggle with
depression, x percent have committed sexual misconduct." Suppose, for example, that a
church had 1,000 pastors, of whom 500 struggled with depression. Suppose further that
only five of those 500 pastors committed sexual misconduct. The fact that only one per-
cent of those who struggled with depression committed sexual misconduct is far more
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Second, plaintiffs have increasingly pursued breach of fiduciary
duty claims against pastors and churches. The court is asked to decide
whether the pastor or bishop created a fiduciary duty to the plain-
tiff—and, if so, whether that duty was breached. Determining whether
a pastor or bishop breached such a duty does not involve an inquiry
into whether he acted as a reasonable minister, some courts explain,
but instead requires that the court ask whether the pastor or bishop
acted "with utmost good faith and solely for the benefit of the [vic-
tim] . "32
The use of fiduciary theory against churches is a complicated is-
sue—worthy of a separate article"—but it has already resulted in a
couple of troubling developments. First, although fiduciary law is in-
tended to address duties in confidential, one-on-one relationships
(such as parent-child or doctor-patient), at least one court has found
that a Catholic diocese and a Catholic parishioner were in a fiduciary
relationshipthat is, "a relationship . 'characterized by a unique
degree of trust and confidence between [each other]] "'m—even
though the diocese was not even aware of the existence of the parish-
ioner and the two had no contact with each other." This standard
imposes upon church officials affirmative obligations toward people
whom they have never met and requires church officials to act "solely
for the benefit" of people who have sharply conflicting interests—
such as, for example, a priest who commits sexual misconduct and a
child he abuses, both of whom, under this boundless interpretation of
fiduciary law, are in a fiduciary relationship with the diocese. Second,
under fiduciary law, courts have purported to assess what acts of minis-
try are or are not in the best interests of a congregant—an inquiry rife
significant than the fact that 100 percent of those who committed sexual misconduct had
struggled with depression. It indicates, most importantly, that those with depression are
not at high risk of committing sexual misconduct. This simple point has been lost on many
plaintiffs' attorneys, judges, and jurors. See, e.g., Moses, 863 P.2d at 328.
" Moses, 863 P.2d at 323 (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also Doe v.
Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2c1 1027, 1061 (N.D. Iowa 1999); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702-
04 (N.J. 1997).
33 See generallyjohn H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the Liability of Churches for Neg-
ligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. RAN. 1167 (2003).
14 Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 429 (2d Cir.
1999) (quoting Dunham v. Dunham, 528 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Conn. 1987)).
See id. at 428-30. The court upheld the substance of an award of $250,000 in punitive
damages against the diocese for breach of that fiduciary duty in connection with sexual
misconduct that had occurred thirty years earlier. Id. at 413, 428-30. The award was subject
to retrial on a statute of limitations issue. Id. at 428, 432.
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with First Amendment implications.3° Again, my concern here is not
primarily with courts reaching the conclusion that a pastor acts
wrongly when he sexually exploits a congregant (although a court
does not need to use fiduciary law to do that). Rather, my concern is
with courts second-guessing the decisions made by bishops and others
in authority within a church."
The final major development is that plaintiffs increasingly have
sued bishops—not (or not just) for damages caused by the pastor's
sexual abuse—but for damages allegedly caused by the bishop in his
handling of the plaintiffs complaint of abuse. The plaintiff argues that,
when she came forward to tell the bishop that she was abused by the
pastor, the bishop and she entered into a fiduciary relationship. When
the bishop did something that she did not like—for example, did not
offer her money or enough money, or did not refer her to a counselor
or to the right counselor—the bishop breached his fiduciary duty."
To my knowledge, plaintiffs have had regular success under this the-
ory only in Colorado, thanks to the egregious decision of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court in Moses v. Diocese of Colorado." In the current
climate, however, I expect these claims to be pursued with vigor in
other states.
III. THE IMPACT
The clergy sexual misconduct lawsuits that have been and will
continue to be filed against churches cannot help but change
churches profoundly, given the large number of such lawsuits, their
potential for enormous (uninsured) verdicts, and the nature of the
claims being pursued.
In at least one important way, clergy sexual misconduct litigation
has changed churches for the better. Churches are now safer places.
Churches got sued a lot in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and, in re-
sponse, they took a number of measures 40 They adopted sexual mis-
" See infra Part
37 Most courts have rejected claims of breach of fiduciary duty asserted in clergy sexual
misconduct cases, either on state law or First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Dausch v.
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1438-39 (7th Cir. 1994); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Stipp. 321, 325-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Kelsey v. Ray, 719 A.2d 1248, 1251 (D.C. 1998); Teadt v. Lutheran Church
Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
33 See, e.g., Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1058; Brown v. Pearson, 483 S.E.2d 477, 484-85
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
39 863 P.2d at 322-23.
4° Most recently, in November 2002, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops ap-
proved the Essential Norms for Diocesan/Eparchial Policies Dealing with Allegations of Sexual
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conduct policies; they removed hundreds of pastors from active minis-
try; they improved seminary screening and training; they treated vic-
tims with care and compassion; they cumulatively paid millions of dol-
lars to victims who either did not or could not sue; they created
"hotlines" and other reporting mechanisms; and they produced edu-
cational materials for parishes and congregations. As a result, by the
late 1990s, the number of complaints of sexual misconduct that
churches' were receiving—and the number of sexual misconduct law-
suits that were being filed against churches—had fallen dramatically.
Almost surely, this was because the amount of misconduct had fallen
dramatically:n There is a reason why the recent publicity surrounding
clergy sexual misconduct has focused almost entirely on misconduct
that occurred ten or more years ago—there simply is not much recent
abuse to report.42
Abuse of Minors by Priest or Deacons (Worms") in response to allegations of clergy sexual
abuse. For a critical examination of these Norms from a canon law perspective, see gener-
ally Ladislas Orsy, Si., Bishops' Norms: Commentary and Evaluation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 999
(2003).
41 The plaintiffs' bar and others have argued that the dearth of reports of recent sex-
ual misconduct does not reflect a reduction in misconduct, but instead the fact that it
sometimes takes victims many years to report misconduct. They are almost certainly wrong.
First, victims are different. Some report sexual misconduct right away; some wait for years.
When I practiced law, I worked on hundreds of cases involving sexual misconduct that had
been reported promptly. If misconduct is continuing unabated, then some recent miscon-
duct should be getting reported. Second, the climate for victims today is dramatically dif-
ferent from the climate of ten years ago. Victims are believed today, and much support is
available to them. it is easier, not harder, for victims to report. Third, one reason why pas-
tors could abuse dozens of people in the past is that those who had evidence of such
abuse—such as congregants or victims' parents—simply could not believe that a pastor was
capable of such conduct. No one is laboring under that illusion today, and congregants
and parents are, if anything, hyper-alert to indications that their pastor is committing sex-
ual misconduct. Finally, if the explanation of the plaintiffs' bar is to be believed, then none
of the steps taken by churches in the past decade—for example, removing from ministry
hundreds of pastors who have committed sexual misconduct—has made churches any
safer. Such a claim is absurd.
42 &A e.g., MASS. OFFICE or 'THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN
THE, ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON: A REPORT BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
15 (2003), available at http://www.ago.state.mams/archdiocese.pdf (reporting that exhaus-
tive investigation of the Archdiocese of Boston "did not produce evidence of recent or
ongoing sexual abuse of children by priests or other Archdiocese workers"); Goodstein,
supra note 6, at Al (discussing a large-scale study of allegations of sexual misconduct made
by 4,268 people against 1,205 priests that indicated that "[m]ost of the abuse occurred in
the 1970's and 1980's" and "[t] he number of priests accused of abuse declined sharply by
the 1990's"); Gregory A. Hall et al., Church in Crisis, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.),
Sept. 29, 2002, at 1X (providing analysis of 185 lawsuits against Archdiocese of Louisville
and reporting that only twenty plaintiffs alleged sexual misconduct after 1985 and only
one after 1990).
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Although churches today are safer—and although the plaintiffs'
bar and victims' advocacy groups deserve a great deal of credit for
that fact—tort litigation will have other, less salutary effects on
churches. Among the most troubling of those effects are the follow-
ing:
A. Monetary Impact
Clergy sexual misconduct lawsuits result in the transfer of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars from churches to plaintiffs, plaintiffs' at-
torneys, defense attorneys, expert witnesses, and others. This not only
harms churches, but harms society.
Churches are required, by law, to devote their resources "exclu-
sively [to] religious, charitable, ... or educational purposes." 43 Part of
the reason why churches receive constitutional protection, and part of
the reason why they are exempt from taxation, is that, broadly speak-
ing, churches promote the public welfare." They not only facilitate
the exercise of religion in its narrowest sense—by, for example, organ-
izing worship services—but they provide food, clothing, shelter, edu-
cation, health care, and other assistance to millions of the most vul-
nerable people in the world.
A large and growing percentage of the clergy sexual misconduct
litigation brought against churches is not covered by insurance. 45
Churches have only two ways to pay the costs of such litigation—
churches can ask the people in the pews to donate more money, or
churches can reduce the services that they provide.
The people in the pews do not seem anxious to increase their
donations to help pay the costs of litigation. Although there is little
evidence that the negative publicity surrounding clergy sexual mis-
conduct has substantially reduced the income of churches,* there is
certainly no evidence that giving has increased as a result of the scan-
dal.
Because it is not realistic to expect donations to increase,
churches have no alternative but to pay for litigation by cutting back
on the services they provide. Sometimes these cutbacks can be rela-
tively painless. For example, if a church sells a vacant building that it
45 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (2000).
41 See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 12 (1989); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
45 See supra Part II.A.4.
45
 SeeJohn Rivera, Despite Scandal, Catholics Give More, BALT. SUN, Feb. 7, 2003, at IA.
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has been holding for investment. purposes or for unspecified future
ministries, the impact on those served by the church is unlikely to be
severe. But other cutbacks—such as closing churches, schools, or shel-
ters—can be quite painful. Again, the impact of such cutbacks falls on
people who not only had no control over the abusive pastor or negli-
gent bishop, but who often were themselves put at risk.
In my view, churches have a moral obligation to assist those
harmed by clergy sexual misconduct. The claim on the church's re-
sources made by someone injured by such misconduct will generally
be morally superior to the claim on those resources made by, for ex-
ample, a student at an inner-city parochial school or a homeless per-
son who resides at a church-operated shelter. But as the amount de-
manded by a victim increases—as the issue shifts from whether the
victim deserves any compensation to whether the victim deserves
$300,000 instead of $250,000—the "marginal" moral force of the vic-
tim's claim diminishes. When the discussion shifts to punitive dam-
ages—damages that, in the church context, almost always punish
people who are both blameless and powerless—it is very difficult to
conclude that a victim's claim to that windfall is morally superior to
the claims of other people served by churches.
Putting aside the issue of what victims deserve, there is an addi-
tional problem. The tort system is a terribly inefficient way to com-
pensate those injured by clergy sexual misconduct (or, for that matter,
those injured in any other way). It is common for a clergy sexual mis-
conduct case that results in, say, a $100,000 verdict or settlement to
cost the defendants—pastor, congregation, and broader church—
$200,000 or more in defense costs. The net result is that $300,000 is
taken away from the ministries of the church in order to put about
$250,000 into the pockets of lawyers and about $50,000 into the
pocket of the victim. 47
B. Impact on the Character of the Ordained Ministry
Perhaps nothing is more important to a church than the identity
of those who exercise ordained ministry. Because "[t]he minister is
the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose,"
the freedom of a church to be able to choose who will teach and
47 A victim's attorney will typically take between a third and a half of her recovery, and
the victim will also have to pay expert witness fees and other expenses.
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preach in its name is its very "lifeblood."48 This is true in at least a
couple of broad respects.
First, what a church believes is inseparable from the identity of its
members—and, in particular, the identity of its leaders. The founders
of the world's great religions often did not speak with clarity on the
most fundamental issues of our time. Those who share the same faith
can have radically different views about such issues as abortion, capital
punishment, euthanasia, immigration, taxes, social welfare, and war.
The view of any particular denomination will to a great extent reflect
the views of those who exercise ministry within it.
Second, what a church does is similarly inseparable from the iden-
tity of its leaders. Two congregations within the same denomination
may have very different ministries—one might be focused on worship
and study, the other on social justice and activism—largely because of
differences between their pastors. Worship services—the locus of
most of the contact between a typical congregant and a typical pas-
tor—may differ dramatically, even within the same denomination, be-
cause of differences among pastors. The experience of a congregant
who seeks out a pastor for aid, comfort, or advice will vary greatly de-
pending upon the pastor she consults. In short, the question of who
exercises ministry within a church is a question with profound reli-
gious implications.
Recognizing this fact, legislatures and courts have historically
given churches almost complete freedom to select their pastors. 49
Clergy sexual misconduct litigation, however, is changing that by at-
taching enormous—potentially catastrophic—consequences to the
decision of a church to ordain, employ, or retain a certain "type" of
person as its minister.
What "type" of person? The most obvious are the Gilbert Gau-
thes—the pastors who have sexually abused many children and whose
crimes are known to their churches. If it were only the Gilbert Gan-
thes who were foreclosed from exercising ministry, few would shed a
tear. But the Gilbert Gauthes are involved in only a tiny minority of
clergy sexual misconduct lawsuits (although they get almost all of the
media attention). In the majority of cases, the conduct of the pastor
was much less serious, and the facts known to the church much more
ambiguous.
48
 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
49 See Patrick J. Schatz & Douglas Laycock, Employment in Religious Organizations, in TIlE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CHURCHES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF LEGAL. STRUC-
TURES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (forthcoming 2004).
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In the 500-phis cases on which I worked, pastors were accused of
a breathtaking array of misconduct. By far, the most common allega-
tion was that the pastor had engaged in a sexual relationship with an
adult congregant—a relationship that appeared to be consensual but
was alleged to be abusive because of the disparity in power between
the pastor and the congregant. Other common allegations were that
the pastor had verbally propositioned the plaintiff, exposed himself to
her, used sexual language that made her feel uncomfortable, induced
her to reveal details of her sexual history, brushed up against her,
kissed her on the mouth, delivered "lingering hugs," or bought her
flowers. In one case in which I was not involved, "an unsolicited kiss
and a rub on the back" resulted in a thirteen-count complaint, several
years of litigation, and, among other things, a forty-five page federal
district court opinion.5°
Similarly, the alleged negligence on the part of the broader
church varied dramatically. In the overwhelming majority of my cases,
there was no evidence that the church knew of prior sexual miscon-
duct by the pastor. In those cases, the plaintiff argued that the church
should have known that the pastor had committed or was likely to
commit sexual misconduct. Sometimes the plaintiff argued that the
church should have been "tipped off" by less serious sexual miscon-
duct, such as the fact that the pastor told dirty jokes, leered at young
women, or looked at pornography. On other occasions, the plaintiffs
argued that it was nonsexual conduct that should have put the church
on notice, such as the fact that the pastor had suffered from depres-
sion or alcoholism or had recently suffered a significant loss in his
life."
It is impossible for bishops to supervise pastors closely, both be-
cause of the nature of churches and because of the nature of ministry.
A typical bishop may have responsibility for hundreds of pastors scat-
tered over thousands of square miles. Most bishops have small staffs
and are themselves quite busy. They have little time to be "in the
field" supervising pastors—and, even if they had more time, they
5° Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1034-35 (N.D. Iowa 1999), In Hartz, the court re-
fused to dismiss a claim that the priest had later committed an "assault" against the plain-
tiff by shaking her hand "during the `sign of peace' in the mass." Id. at 1066-67.
51 It is only a matter of time before a plaintiff will allege that a church's knowledge that
a pastor was himself a victim of sexual abuse should have put the church on notice that the
pastor was at high risk of abusing others. See Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God
Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1220-21 (Alaska 1991). Seventy percent of priests who sexually
abuse minors were themselves abused as children. See Marianne Szegedy-Maszak et al.,
Chastity and Lust, U,S, NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 1, 2002, at 54.
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could, at most, spend a few hours with each pastor. Pastors who have
no difficulty hiding their sexual misconduct from their families and
congregants—people who spend hundreds of hours with them each
year—obviously will have little difficulty hiding their sexual miscon-
duct from their bishops. Moreover, even if every bishop were respon-
sible for supervising only one pastor, the bishop would still have
difficulty monitoring the day-to-day work of that pastor. Much of what
pastors do is necessarily done in private—in their offices, in the
homes of congregants, at hospital bedsides. Indeed, pastors are often
required by law to maintain the confidentiality of much of what they
do.52
Because it is impossible for bishops to supervise pastors closely, a
bishop is faced with a difficult choice when he receives troubling in-
formation about a pastor—such as a report that the pastor engaged in
an extramarital sexual relationship or was hospitalized for depression.
The bishop can remove the pastor from active ministry, or the bishop
can leave the pastor in active ministry, knowing that, if the pastor
commits sexual misconduct in the future, the bishop may be found
negligent and his church ruined.
This is no small problem. Those in ministry suffer from depres-
sion, alcoholism, and similar maladies at least as often as members of
the general public. 53 Moreover, the ministry continues to be a male-
dominated profession, and there is no reason to believe that male
pastors are any less likely than other men to engage in such common
behavior as viewing pornography or becoming involved in an extra-
marital sexual relationship.54
 In other words, it seems likely that a ma-
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §•24-9-22 (2003); MASS, GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (2000);
Mtcn. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 1992).
55 EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURC.II IN AM ERICA, MINISTERIAL HEA1:111 AND WELLNESS
REPORT, 2002, at 21 (2002) ("During a one-year period, 6% of U.S. men and 12% of
women suffer from depression, while 16% of male clergy and 24% of female clergy com-
plained of problems with depression."); Goodstein, supra note 6, at Al (discussing a psy-
chological study that "found that 57 percent of [Roman Catholic] priests were psychologi-
cally 'underdeveloped'"); Thomas Maeder, Wounded Healers, Anditcrtc MONTHLY, Jan.
1989, at 41 ("[S]tudies of the clergy ... suggest a high incidence of family problems and
narcissistic disorders, and a host of other problems involving interpersonal relations and
self-esteem."); Ernest Tucker, Deliverance from Temptation, Cul. SUN-Ttm Es, Aug. 22, 1999, at
22 ("[A] 1995 study at Georgetown University of members of religious orders estimated
that 11 percent of the priests and 5 percent of the nuns had problems with alcoholism
54 For statistics regarding the extent of infidelity among married men, see Norman,
supra note 8. For statistics on the size and scope of the pornography industry, see Timothy
Egan, Technology Sent Wall Street into Afarket for Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at Al.
For statistics on the same topic, as well as on the involvement of clergy in extramarital sex-
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jowly of those in ministry have something in their past that could later
be cited by a plaintiff's attorney as evidence that they were at risk of
engaging in sexual misconduct.
Bishops vary substantially in the degree of legal risk that they are
willing to accept. Even the least risk-adverse bishops, though, are go-
ing to remove from active ministry many men and women in addition
to the Gilbert. Gauthes. The result will be a changed ministry—a min-
istry disproportionately composed of people who have not struggled
with serious problems (such as depression or addiction), who have
not suffered grievous losses (such as the death of a loved one), and
who have not made serious mistakes (such as committing adultery).
The only "flawed" people who will remain in ministry are those who
have successfully hidden their problems from others—that is, those
who have received the least help for their problems.
Increasingly, then, the ministry will become less representative of
the people it serves. This cannot help but significantly affect the de-
velopment of religious thought. Consider that Saint Augustine, per-
haps the most influential Christian thinker in history after Saint Paul,
would not be ordained by many American churches today because of
the life he led before his conversion to Christianity. 55 Or consider that
Martin Luther King, jr., perhaps the most influential religious leader
of the twentieth century, would be removed from ministry by many
bishops today if his extramarital sexual conduct became known. 56
Likewise, removing "flawed" people from ministry will also hamper
the ability of pastors to help hurting people—people who are hurting
because they are suffering from precisely the kinds of problems that
those in ministry are no longer safely "allowed" to have.
C. Impact on the Bishop's and Pastor's Relationships with congregants
Clergy sexual misconduct litigation has already had an impact on
the relationship between pastors and congregants. Many pastors have
altered the way that they relate to congregants so as to protect against
false allegations of sexual misconduct. Many pastors will no longer
meet with congregants in private homes, no longer engage in one-on-
one discussions with congregants in their offices (unless it is during
ual contact and pornography, see Prodigals International, Stats and Facts About Sexual Ad-
diction, at hup://www.iprodigals.com/dox/prg.htm
 (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
55 See SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 24-29, 37-38, 109 (Henry Chadwick trans., Ox-
ford University Press 1991).
56 See DAVID]. GARROW, TIE FBI AND MARTIN 1.U'I1IER KINGJR. 156, 159, 162 (1981).
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office hours, staff are present, and the door is open), and no longer
participate in the type of youth activities that in the past led to friend-
ships between pastors and young people and inspired many young
people to pursue ordained ministry themselves.
If courts follow the lead of Moses a Diocese of Colorado and impose
fiduciary obligations on those in ministry, both bishops and pastors
will have an incentive to keep congregants at arm's length. Bear in
mind that, in Moses, the plaintiff was awarded over $700,000 for the
injuries that she had suffered—not on account of being sexually
abused—but on account of such things as the bishop failing "to assist
[her] in understanding that she was not the only person responsible
for her sexual relationship." 57
 I defended one bishop from a Moses
claim alleging that he had breached his fiduciary duty to a victim by
advising her to disclose that she had been sexually exploited by her
pastor (this allegedly subjected her to blame and retaliation), while I
was simultaneously defending another bishop from a Moses claim al-
leging that he had breached his fiduciary duty to a victim by advising
her not to disclose that she had been sexually exploited by her pastor
(this allegedly forced her to "suffer in silence"). I defended a couple
of bishops from Moses claims alleging that they had breached their
fiduciary duties by expressing their honest opinion to an adult victim
that she bore some moral responsibility for a long-term sexual rela-
tionship with her pastor. Such claims should hardly be surprising,
given that, in Moses itself, one of the plaintiff's expert witnesses told
the jury that the bishop had breached his fiduciary obligation by
hearing the victim's confession and granting her absolution. (This,
the expert said, wrongly implied to the victim that she had done
something wrong.) 58
If providing pastoral care to a person creates a fiduciary relation-
ship, and if creating such a relationship leaves open every aspect of
one's ministry to judicial second-guessing (and potential six- and
"863 P.2d 310, 323 (Colo. 1993).
58 See Appellants' Opening Brief at 16 n.7, Moses, 863 P.2d 310 (No. 91 CA 2069). In
Klein v. Rocky Afountain Conference of the United Methodist Church, a Methodist bishop was
ordered to pay $350,000 in compensatory and $247,500 in punitive damages to a plaintiff
for damages caused by the bishop's allegedly insensitive handling of the complaint of sex-
ual misconduct. See No. 94CV0521 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 4, 1994). Among other things, the
bishop was accused of not making sufficient counseling available to the plaintiff and not
adequately preparing an interim pastor to provide pastoral care to her. In both Moses and
Klein, then, bishops were forced to pay enormous damages because a jury disapproved of
the way that they had provided pastoral care—an act of ministry—to a victim of sexual mis-
conduct.
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seven-figure verdicts), then many pastors will decide that providing
such care is not worth the risks. They will devote their energies to
worship services and other group activities, leaving victims of sexual
abuse and others who seek care and comfort to look elsewhere.
D. Impact on the Relationship Between Bishop and Pastor
Clergy sexual misconduct litigation has forever changed the rela-
tionship between pastors and their ecclesiastical superiors. Histori-
cally, that relationship was often one of support. A bishop functioned
as the "pastor to the pastors." The bishop was the first person—some-
times the only person—to whom a pastor would turn when he needed
pastoral care.
The bishop is now the last person to whom a pastor would want
to turn for help. If a bishop learns from a pastor that lie has engaged
in sexual misconduct of some kind—or that lie is suffering from some
serious problem that might cause him to "drop his guard a little"°—
the bishop may end that pastor's ministry rather than risk ruinous liti-
gation.° Moreover, if some state legislators have their way, the bishop
may have to report the pastor to law enforcement officers, even if the
pastor was speaking to him in confidence—indeed, even if the pastor
was speaking within the confines of the "priest-penitent" privilege. 01
It is difficult to understand how these changes will help anyone.
In countless cases in which I was involved, a bishop was able to help a
pastor—by, for example, arranging for the pastor to receive medical
or psychological help—before that pastor committed sexual miscon-
duct (or additional sexual misconduct) or otherwise acted to harm
others or himself. Depriving troubled pastors of the one "safe" place
that many of them have to seek help with their problems seems likely
to result in more harmful conduct and more victims.
" See Appellee's Answer Brief at 6, Moses, 863 P.2d 310 (No. 91 CA 2069).
60 For a examination of how canon law provides means for a bishop to discipline a
priest who commits sexual abuse, see generally John J. Coughlin, O.F.M., The Clergy Sexual
Abuse Crisis and the Spirit of Canon Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 977 (2003).
°I See Jo Becker & Caryle Murphy, McGarrick Decries Md. Child Abuse Bill, WAsn. Pos•r,
Feb. 22, 2003, at B1 ("[L]awmakers in Kentucky and New Hampshire want to eliminate the
priest-penitent privilege altogether . • ."). Texas already requires clergy to report informa-
tion about child sexual abuse, even when that information is provided during confession.
See 11X. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(c) (Vernon 2002). For a survey and analysis of priest-
penitent privileges and child abuse reporting statutes in the fifty states, see generally Nor-
man Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege and the Duty to
Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. REV. 1127 (2003).
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E. impact on the Relationship Between the Broader Church and Congregations
The changes described above will result from the desire of
churches to avoid being found negligent in a sexual misconduct case,
but churches are also likely to take steps to avoid vicarious liability.
Churches can do nothing to affect whether the courts of a particular
state will hold that a pastor who commits sexual misconduct acts
within the scope of his agency, but churches can take steps to mini-
mize the chances that they will be found to be in a principal-agent
relationship with the pastor. This is especially true for the regional
and national expressions of a church, which often do not directly em-
ploy the pastors who serve in congregations. 62
A church that has only limited control over its congregations and
pastors has two options for avoiding vicarious liability. The first is to
relinquish the limited control it has—viz., to create more distance be-
tween itself and its pastors and congregations. The less authority that
a church exercises over a pastor or the congregation that employs
him, the less chance that the church will be held vicariously liable for
the pastor's misconduct. The second is to increase its control over con-
gregations and pastors. Such increased control will make it more
likely that the pastor will he regarded as the agent of the church, but
it will give the church more power to prevent sexual misconduct from
occurring in the first place.63
Whether a church chooses to make itself more or less hierarchi-
cal, the ministry of the church will be affected. Moreover, the church
will be deciding how to structure itself—how its constituent elements
will relate to one another—not based upon its understanding of
God's will or its beliefs about how ministry can most effectively be
conducted, but rather to avoid being ruined by a clergy sexual mis-
conduct lawsuit. Matters of structure are critically important; they
were near the heart of the Reformation. A Protestant need only con-
sider her likely reaction if her church decided to elect a Pope, and a
Catholic her likely reaction if her church decided to dispense with the
Papacy, to understand why structure matters.
82
 For an examination of factors determining whether religious entities are proper de-
fendants in clergy sexual abuse cases, see generally Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against
Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2003).
" See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at 422 ("The rules about ascending liability
for torts ... push churches toward the extremes of hierarchicalism and congregationalism,
and away from moderate or mixed forms of polity").
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F. Impact on the Character of Organized Religion
Religion receives constitutional protection in part because it acts
as a counterbalance to the state." Stephen L. Carter and others have
argued that religion should be protected because it serves as an "ex-
ternal moral critic and alternative source of values and meaning."65
Because religion is, at bottom, a "group search for sense and value"
that is "focus[ed] on the ultimate," Carter contends that religion is
"more likely than other competing sources of authority" to challenge
the state's "imposed" meanings and thereby to serve as a bulwark
against tyranny66
Religion is a matter of faith, not reason, and thus many religious
beliefs and practices are "unreasonable." Indeed, churches are some-
times at their best when they are at their most "unreasonable." "Un-
reasonable" religious leaders were at the forefront of efforts to abolish
slavery in the nineteenth century and fight racial discrimination in
the twentieth century. Those efforts drew considerable ire—and, in
the case of religious leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr.—assassins'
bullets. But America would be a much worse place today if these reli-
gious leaders had been forced to act more "reasonably."
One reason why clergy sexual misconduct litigation is trou-
bling—one reason why it burdens religious liberty—is that it gives
hundreds of juries around the United States almost complete free-
dom to act against churches out of religious animus, even when that
animus has nothing to do with the evidence in the case. As described
above,67 jurors in sexual misconduct cases are invited to award dam-
ages for purely emotional injuries—and, in some cases, to punish
churches for reckless or intentional wrongdoing. Jurors have virtually
unbounded discretion in making these decisions. No objective stan-
dard guides jurors in deciding how much a plaintiff should be com-
pensated for "shame" or "low self-esteem" nor in deciding how much
parishioners should be "punished" for decisions that they did not
64 For an exploration of the limits of this constitutional protection in the context of
clergy sexual abuse, see generally Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young
People: Catholic and Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1031 (2003).
66, STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLI-
•ICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 273 (1993).
€4 id,
67 See supra Part II.A.3.
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make. Jurors are free to "pick a number," with little or no effective
judicial oversight."
Almost every clergy sexual misconduct lawsuit presents an oppor-
tunity for a jury to cripple a church financially—if not a national
church, then at least a congregation or judicatory. Churches cannot
help but be chilled by this threat. I recently asked a bishop why he
had been so quiet regarding an issue of public importance on which
both he and his church had been outspoken in the past. "With all of
this litigation," he answered, "we're just hunkering down in our fox-
holes, trying to keep our heads from getting blown off." 'What the
bishop was saying was that, with the financial survival of his church
likely to be in the hands of various judges and jurors in the near fu-
ture, he was not going to do anything to create anger toward himself
or his church.
I worry that, with the gun of clergy sexual misconduct litigation
pointed at their heads, churches may stop acting like churches. Like
all earthly institutions, churches are deeply flawed, and some church
leaders have made horrendous mistakes. Over the centuries, though,
churches have been a force for incalculable good. Today churches
provide food to millions who are hungry, clothing to millions who are
naked, shelter to millions who are homeless, education to millions
who are uneducated, medical care to millions who are sick, and com-
fort to millions who are dying. Moreover, on so many issues—eco-
nomic justice, racial discrimination, the treatment of undocumented
aliens, the death penalty, society's obligations to the mentally or
physically disabled, terrorism, and war—the prophetic voices of
churches have never been needed more.
Clergy sexual misconduct victims have suffered a grievous wrong,
and it is understandable why legislators and courts have felt com-
pelled to find ways to compensate them. Clergy sexual misconduct
litigation, however, has the potential to create a new class of victims,
much larger than those now involved in suing churches. The chal-
lenge for society—and particularly for churches—is to devise a means
au Much the same could be said of any case in which jurors are asked to award dam-
ages for emotional injury or punitive damages, even when the defendant is, say, the local
Wal-Mart store. The difference is that the First Amendment protects churches; it does not
protect Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart has not been the subject of bigotry and persecution for at least
two thousand years, nor has Wal-Mart been deemed so valuable to society, and so vulner-
able to persecution, that it is protected by a constitutional amendment.
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of fairly compensating victims with as little harm to religious liberty as
possible.°
69
 I have described one possible means of meeting this challenge. See Patrick J. Schiltz,
The Future of Sexual Abuse Litigation, AMERICA, July 7-14, 2003, at 8, 10-11.
